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Abstract
This article analyses Australian media’s coverage of China’s efforts to contain COVID-19. The 
article is a critical discourse analysis of the major news stories, documentaries, opinions, and 
analyses published in the entire array of Australian media, including both television and radio 
programs from the taxpayer-funded public broadcaster the ABC, commercial media outlets 
such as Murdoch’s The Australian newspaper and Nine Entertainment’s The Sydney Morning 
Herald, and several tabloid papers. By identifying the key themes, perspectives, and angles used 
in these reports and narratives, this article finds that the more credible media outlets have 
mostly framed China’s efforts in political and ideological terms, rather than as an issue of public 
health. In comparison, the tabloid media—including commercial television, shock jock radio, 
and newspapers—have resorted to conspiratorial, racist, and Sino-phobic positions. In both 
instances, the coverage of China’s experience is a continuation and embodiment of the “China 
threat” and “Chinese influence” discourses that have now dominated the Australian media for 
a number of years.
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Australia is an Oceanic country with geographical proximity to both Asia and the Pacific. China 
has long been Australia’s biggest trading partner, contributing close to AUD$200 billion worth of 
imports and exports (Chau, 2019). Australia’s economic prosperity has been crucially dependent 
on its capacity to sell iron ore, coal, beef, wine, and dairy to China, as well as attracting tourists and 
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international students from China. Although located in the southern hemisphere, Australia identi-
fies culturally and politically with the “global West.” More than ever before, Australia has had to 
reckon with the fact that its economic prosperity relies on a country that, in the words of Australia’s 
longtime defense analyst Hugh White, is not “Anglo-Saxon” (quoted in Clark, 2018), and is not a 
liberal democracy. Australia sees itself as a middle power, and with the United States and China 
increasingly at loggerheads with each other, finds itself caught between the two. As Australia’s 
former secretary of the Department of Defense Dennis Richardson (2017) put it, “Australia is 
friends with both, ally of one.” All these factors ensure that China is Australia’s biggest conun-
drum, and this “China Conundrum”—can’t live with you, can’t live without you—inevitably 
makes China Australia’s biggest media story.
China has increasingly adopted an assertive position on the global stage, with its widely and openly 
declared “going global” agenda aimed at globalizing Chinese media and projecting a more attractive 
image of China (Sun, 2015). This has bred a pervasive sense of fear about China’s political and eco-
nomic influence in Australia, manifesting in an acceleration of anti-Chinese public discourses in the 
past few years (e.g. Hamilton, 2018; Hartcher, 2019). In the words of one commentator, “anti-China 
sentiment in Australia risks becoming a national pastime” (Camilleri, 2020). The “China influence” 
narrative is, in the words of Australia’s former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans (2020), “careering out 
of control in Australia, as evidenced in a daily drumbeat of hostile mainstream media articles.” 
Manifesting this anxiety, there has been a noticeable shift toward what has been called “adversarial 
journalism” (ABC Radio, 2019; Sun, 2019a) in the coverage of China. Here, being adversarial is not 
about the media being a “watch dog” over the government, or being “the fourth estate,” with a core 
mission of “keeping the bastards honest,” as the saying goes in Australian politics. Instead, it refers to 
a kind of reporting that takes as given that China is a hostile nation, and that this perception “legiti-
mizes ways of reporting on China that are adversarial in a pre-determined way”. This adversarial per-
spective not only dictates what kinds of stories readers should hear and read about China, but it also 
dictates how these stories are told. Accordingly, the ritual of objective reporting, which requires an 
attempt at balance and the provision of evidence supporting your claims, is no longer necessary.
Adversarial journalism in Australia’s mainstream English-language media is not just about sto-
ries that are critical of China. Rather, it involves the adoption of a pre-determined news-making 
agenda that privileges a particular point of view—in this case, that of the security and intelligence 
establishment—at the expense of other perspectives, and the consequently narrow framework for 
selecting what to cover and how to cover it. This approach to reporting on China had become the 
norm for several years before COVID-19, and any analysis of how the Australian media reported 
China’s experience with COVID-19 must keep this backdrop firmly in mind.
COVID-19: from Wuhan to Australia
On 23 January 2020, with the announcement of a lockdown in Wuhan in China’s Hubei province, 
Sydney airport began screening passengers arriving from that city. The travel advisory for Australians 
wanting to visit Hubei was subsequently raised to level 4: “Do not travel.” Australia’s first case of 
SARS-CoV-2 (the virus that causes COVID-19) was confirmed on 25 January—a man from Wuhan 
traveling on flight CZ321 from Guangzhou to Melbourne a week earlier. On the same day, three other 
people tested positive in Sydney after also returning from Wuhan. As more school students and their 
parents returned from China after Australia’s long summer holiday (which coincided with China’s 
Spring Festival), Chinese-Australian parents took to WeChat with two online petitions asking the 
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Australian Government to quarantine students who had visited China during the school holidays 
(Kozaki & Nguyen, 2020). Meanwhile, as many Australian citizens of Chinese origin were still 
stranded in Wuhan, the Australian government announced on 29 January that it would send planes to 
Wuhan to bring them back, but would quarantine them for 14 days on Christmas Island, a remote 
Australian island well-known for its now-closed immigration detention center. In response to increas-
ingly many cases of infection in Australia, the government shut its borders to China on 1 February.
Against this backdrop, what are the dominant narrative frameworks within which China’s COVID-
19 crisis was reported? What geopolitical, ideological, economic, and cultural forces shape and 
account for these narrative frameworks? What does Australian media’s reporting of China’s experi-
ence with COVID-19 tell us about the role of in shaping the geopolitical landscape featuring China’s 
rise, on one hand, and the growing hostility between China and the United States, on the other hand? 
Focusing on these questions, this article is a critical analysis of the major news stories, documenta-
ries, opinions, and analyses published in Australia’s most influential media outlets between 1 January 
and 31 March 2020, with a view to identifying the key themes, perspectives, and angles in these 
reports. The material chosen for analysis falls into one of several categories: (1) key media programs 
that are widely considered to be authoritative and trustworthy, (2) media stories written by journalists 
who enjoy the highest level of professional recognition in the field of journalism, (3) media narratives 
that elicit the strongest responses from China, the Chinese-Australian community, and English-
speaking public in Australia. The article is less concerned with presenting a quantitative content 
analysis in order to show bias in the framing of these stories—that is taken as given (Evans, 2020; Hu, 
2020; Jiang, 2019). Instead, I am more interested in exploring the likely role that opinion leaders, 
high-impact media programs, news stories, and journalistic practices play in shaping public opinion 
of China and its handling of COVID-19. Before discussing how different media sectors in Australia 
responded to the outbreak of the pandemic in China, it is useful to offer an overview of the structure 
and landscape of Australia’s media, and of how changing geopolitical dynamics have shaped 
Australian media discourses of China in the few years before COVID-19.
Australia media—structure and landscape
Like the United Kingdom, Australia has a bifurcated media landscape, featuring both a strong 
public broadcasting sector and a competitive commercial sector. The public sector consists of the 
hybrid-funded multicultural broadcaster, the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), and the 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC, radio, television, and online). Similar to the BBC in 
institutional structure and organizational ethos, the ABC is widely considered to be the most 
authoritative and trustworthy media and news organization in Australia, as repeatedly found in 
national surveys by market research company Roy Morgan (Knox, 2019), including during the 
Coronavirus pandemic (Roy Morgan, 2020). The ABC’s flagship programs include influential pro-
grams such as the weekly Four Corners, described by the ABC itself as “Australia’s premier inves-
tigative journalism program” (ABC Iview, 2019). Similarly, Q+A, a high-profile panel discussion 
program that airs on Mondays right after Four Corners, features politicians and opinion leaders, 
and is dedicated to discussing important issues of the day. Both programs play an important role in 
shaping the national discussion, and even the formulation of government policies.
The commercial sector is much more complex, but in recent years, its diversity has been greatly 
diminished by a number of take-overs and mergers. For instance, the removal of the “two-out-of-
three” media ownership rule in 2017 (Dwyer, 2016) led to the take-over of Fairfax Media, a major 
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independent print media company, by Nine Entertainment (Muller, 2018)—“a company known more 
for its tabloid style than independent journalism” (Dwyer & Koskie, 2019). As a result, well-known 
Fairfax mastheads such as The Sydney Morning Herald (hereafter SMH), The Age in Melbourne, and 
The Australian Financial Review have become part of the Nine Entertainment empire. Meanwhile, 
media outlets in Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp still dominate the Australian market, with print titles 
including the broadsheet The Australian, tabloids such as The Daily Telegraph and the Herald Sun, a 
wide range of magazines, pay TV channels, and local/regional newspapers, and Sky News Australia, 
known for its right-wing personalities and editorial stance. Between them, News Corp and Nine 
Entertainment now control the bulk of Australia’s newspaper sector. In addition, shock-jock radio 
personalities such as Ray Hadley and the recently retired Alan Jones on Sydney’s 2GB have been 
highly influential, and are widely known for riding on populist sentiments and espousing a generally 
right-wing political agenda (Fowler, 2018). They sit at the opposite end of the ideological spectrum 
from the ABC, which right-wing politicians and conservative members of the public believe is domi-
nated by “lefties,” and their radio programs are often a favorite place for politicians to make their 
voices heard. As Ranald MacDonald (2019), founder of the Australian Press Council and former CEO 
and editor-in-chief of the then-Fairfax paper The Age, laments, “the Australian Coalition Government 
and the Rupert Murdoch empire, the ‘shocking’ jocks and the Right-wing ideologists are limiting any 
chance of informed public debate in this country.”
The Australian media’s adoption of adversarial journalism in covering China is not limited to 
the right-wing media, and is certainly not monopolized by the tabloids. Over the past few years, the 
China influence narrative, which manifests in a multitude of political, social, and cultural issues, 
has grown to dominate the Australian news media’s coverage of China. The best example is per-
haps “Power and Influence,” a Four Corners investigation into political donations by Chinese 
nationals and Chinese Australians, which aired in June 2017 (ABC Television, 2017). The program 
provided a timely and much-needed exposé of an area that is ripe for reform, and not just in relation 
to donations from foreign nationals. However, it was also widely criticized for its framing of these 
issues, as well as for journalistic practices that has been called “insinuative journalism” (Sun & Yu, 
2019)—a style of reporting on China’s influence that operates on guilt by association, suggesting 
“links” and “connections”—however tenuous—rather than producing actual evidence of Chinese 
influence (Laurenceson, 2019).
Despite being mired in defamation suits and receiving criticism from several quarters, the 2017 
episode of Four Corners has significantly shaped the ways in which China has been reported in 
subsequent years. As a joint production of the taxpayer-funded ABC and the commercial operator 
Fairfax, “Power and Influence” also embodies another serious problem that has plagued the ABC’s 
news and current affairs coverage of the Chinese influence debate and Australia-China relations in 
general: after many decades as the nation’s leader in journalistic standards, the public broadcaster 
seems to have allowed itself to be influenced by the news values and news-making practices of 
commercial outlets (Sun, 2019b).
ABC, COVID-19, and China
True to its uncontestable reputation as the most trustworthy media outlet in Australia, the ABC has 
played a crucial role in keeping the country informed during the COVID-19 pandemic. The ABC’s 
resident journalist, health reporter, and physician Dr Norman Swan’s “Coronacast,” a podcast that 
answers various questions about the virus, is currently among Australia’s most listened-to and 
downloaded podcasts. In the words of an SMH journalist, “From the start of the COVID-19 
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pandemic, two voices [Norman Swan and Tegan Taylor] have helped calm the nerves of Australians, 
while keeping us informed on the outbreak, with practical, actionable ways we can all help flatten 
the curve” (Wells, 2020).
Parallel to this, the ABC’s news and current affairs coverage of COVID-19 in China has mostly 
been framed as a political story, and once again we turn to Four Corners to identify the key narra-
tive ingredients in this framing. On Monday, 24 February 2020, a month after the Wuhan lock-
down, Four Corners aired the first of several episodes about COVID-19. At this point, 15 cases 
had been reported in Australia, and the Australian government had shut the borders to travelers 
from China. This episode, simply titled “Coronavirus,” focused on China, whereas subsequent 
episodes turned their attention to the United States, and to Australia’s domestic efforts at contain-
ing the virus. A careful analysis of the narrative framework in this first episode is instructive. 
Presented by ABC reporter, Sean Nicholls, the investigation featured numerous individuals, includ-
ing an Australian think-tank commentator (Richard McGregor), an epidemiologist (Raina 
MacIntyre), a former ABC (and now BBC) China correspondent (Stephen McDonnell), a China-
based political commentator (Wu Qiang) who fell out of favor for his criticisms of how the Chinese 
government handled the crisis, and a Chinese-Australian migrant from Wuhan, a Chinese health 
official, a local resident in Wuhan, a few medical workers in Wuhan hospitals, and an Australian 
expat living in Wuhan (Tim McLean).
The Four Corners program juggles a few narrative frames. It first presents the perspective of 
health experts sharing their views on how the novel virus developed, what its connections and dif-
ferences were with earlier pandemics, and what were the likely scenarios brought about by the 
outbreak in China. Tinged with anxiety and concern, the tone of the experts is tentative and explor-
atory, offering their authoritative views on these questions, but also stressing the novel nature of 
the virus and the uncertainties this raises. Another angle is the inadequate handling of the virus by 
the Chinese government. Giving voice to both angry Wuhan residents and Australian expats, the 
program projected an image of hospitals failing to cope, medical staff becoming desperate, and, 
more prominently, the heavy-handedness of local authorities, with the implication of infringements 
of individuals’ human rights. Tim McLean says to the camera,
The police are actually knocking on doors . . ., they’re dragging them out, mate. . . . It’s quite terrifying 
knowing that people can knock on your door and drag you out for no reason at all, because you’ve got a 
temperature. (ABC Television, 2020a)
Apart from projecting the impression of draconian and authoritarian measures, the program also 
repeatedly returns to the question of Wuhan local government’s tardy response to the initial out-
break. Speaking about the serious ramifications of this delay, Richard McGregor, from the 
Australian think-tank the Lowy Institute, believes that ‘local officials in Wuhan did withhold 
information’:
They lost about two weeks, maybe three weeks, just when the virus was at it’s [sic] sort of nascent point, 
just at a time where they could have traced it, just at a time where perhaps they could have checked it more 
substantially. But that was lost because it got caught up in the politics of the information flow and 
information surveillance in China. (ABC Television, 2020a)
McGregor also goes further, spelling out the threat the pandemic poses to Xi Jinping’s political 
regime, and arguing that unless Xi can get control of the narrative, the pandemic could “damage 
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his image . . . even with ordinary Chinese people.” Related to this constant refrain linking the 
outbreak of COVID-19 to political control is the fate of whistleblower Dr Li Wenliang, within the 
narrative framework of censorship. Political commentator Wu Qiang says,
The public intellectuals and the public both realised that Dr Li represents the conscience of China. He was 
suppressed from the beginning from telling the truth. He could have saved . . . thousands of people’s lives. 
But all this was concealed due to the authority’s suppression of free speech. (ABC Television, 2020a)
The issue related to Dr Li is also interpreted as a symptom of censorship by the Communist Party 
of China (CPC), and Xi Jinping’s desire for tight political control. As Stephen McDonnell says,
Doctor Li was disciplined by his own hospital. He was even picked up by the police and taken in, and 
castigated and told not to spread rumours. This is what happens when you are saying things publicly that 
the Communist Party doesn’t like. (ABC Television, 2020a)
The claims of censorship, the criticisms of local authorities’ failure to inform the public, and the 
denunciation of the severe measures taken by the police and Wuhan’s local government followed a 
well-established narrative framework of reporting on China. China’s coercive measures aimed at 
controlling people’s movements, portrayed in terms of heavy-handed policing and infringements of 
individuals’ civil liberties and human rights, were all reported in light of China’s political system—
the implication being that such practices would not happen in a liberal democracy. In reality, how-
ever, many similar coercive strategies—police enforcement of social distancing, mandatory 
quarantine, hefty fines for refusal to conform to new rules and curfews—were all adopted in 
Australia’s state of Victoria in July and August, in response to a second wave of the pandemic, and 
were rationalized as extraordinary but necessary measures. Thus, there seems to be an implicit 
assumption that there is “bad authoritarianism,” which is readily practiced by undemocratic states 
such as China, and there is “necessary authoritarianism,” which is reluctantly adopted by liberal 
democracies in order to contain and suppress the virus for the greater good of the community and 
society. While Australia’s media seems to assume the difference between these two kinds of authori-
tarianism in order to justify the equally heavy-handed, approach adopted in Australia, there has been 
little attempt to discursively disaggregate the authoritarian measures China invoked to combat 
COVID-19, and the authoritarian practices China is routinely criticized for in the Australian media.
It could be argued that China’s political authoritarianism is linked to, and in some ways, caused 
the outbreak of the pandemic. This view seems to be implicit in criticisms of the Hubei govern-
ment’s failure to inform Beijing promptly, and its attempts to suppress individuals wanting to blow 
the whistle. This, however, does not acknowledge that governments in both China and Australia 
operate according to the logic of both bureaucratic checks and balances and administrative self-
preservation and self-interest. The mistakes made by Hubei’s government—its lack of transpar-
ency and reluctance to inform the public and the central government—were mostly framed as 
manifestations of China’s authoritarianism. In contrast, even though similar mistakes were made in 
Australia in its own handling of the virus—think of the Ruby Princess debacle, whereby the NSW 
authorities allowed a cruise ship to dock in Sydney despite the fact the ship was carrying 663 
infected passengers,  Victoria’s hotel quarantine breach, (Bashan, 2020; Visontay, 2020), and the 
government’s reluctance to disclose certain information to the public (Grattan, 2020)—have typi-
cally been reported as bureaucratic bungles or administrative mishandlings.
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The privileging of this political framework is further evidenced in the ABC’s Q+A, hosted by 
Hamish Macdonald. The episode that went to air live right after the Four Corners program dis-
cussed earlier also featured China and COVID-19 and focused on the Australia-China relationship. 
The panel comprised Wang Xining, deputy head of China’s Embassy in Australia, Vicky Xu, an 
outspoken critic of China and researcher at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Raina 
MacIntyre, an infectious disease expert who also appeared in the Four Corners program, Jason 
Yat-Sen Li, China business expert and chair of the Australia-China Forum, and journalist Stan 
Grant, who had covered the SARS outbreak in China. The discussion aimed to cover a wide range 
of issues, as evidenced in the preamble to the show:
Tonight—are we too reliant on China? It’s our biggest customer, a global superpower, but coronavirus 
leaves China isolated, and the impact on Australia is huge. Our economy is hurting, our diplomatic ties are 
under strain, and many of you are sharing personal stories about a rise in anti-Asian attitudes. You’ve got 
the questions, now let’s get you some answers. Welcome to Q+A. (ABC Television, 2020b)
Although the agenda for discussion seemed wide-ranging, the discussion soon got bogged down in 
a lengthy stoush between Wang Xining and Vicky Xu over issues such as the Chinese government’s 
initial suppression of information, especially in relation to Li Wenliang, its failure to act quickly 
enough, and its heavy-handed response to COVID-19 when it did take action. But the discussion 
also veered off topic and shifted to China’s treatment of the Uighurs. This stoush, which mostly took 
the form of Wang doing his best to defend China’s position and criticizing the West for its biased 
reporting on China, pitted against Xu’s feisty interrogation of him, was clearly the highlight of the 
episode, attracting much social media comment and subsequent mainstream media coverage. That 
this conflict was intentionally built into the program is not only clear in the choice of these two 
panelists, who embody predictable binary positions, but also in the choice of “viewers” who were 
scheduled to ask questions. For instance, to keep the momentum on the debate on the Uighurs, Q+A 
had scheduled a question from an Adelaide-based Uighur Australian whose wife and son were under 
house arrest in Xinjiang, and whose friend’s wife was detained in a Chinese prison.
The conflation of political authoritarianism with what I shall call “public health authoritarian-
ism” is one key feature of the ABC’s reporting of China and COVID-19. Another way in which 
China’s political control is indelibly scripted into the Australian media’s reporting is the juxtaposi-
tion of a well-established “political control” narrative with reporting on China’s efforts to control 
COVID-19. A story that exemplifies this juxtaposition is ABC correspondent Bill Birtles’ reporting 
on Xi Jinping’s visit to Wuhan on 11 March 2020, when Wuhan was emerging from several weeks’ 
hard lockdown. ABC Radio’s (2020) AM host, Linda Mottram, introduced the story saying that the 
number of infections in China was falling rapidly, but adding “according to official figures at 
least.” Rather than reporting this as a straightforward story of the national leader’s symbolic tour 
to mark Wuhan’s well-earned victory, Birtles started by contrasting the positive messages appear-
ing in the “state media” and on “government television” with a “very different story” online, refer-
ring to photos taken by Wuhan residents showing police occupying residential balconies, making 
sure that residents did not “yell at” the President. Birtles reported that Xi’s tour “went smoothly” 
due to “tight security,” and commented on China’s success, but qualified this by mentioning 
China’s earlier attempt to cover up the scale of infection. This is an example of a few stock narra-
tives—media propaganda, lack of transparency on the part of the government, violations of 
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citizens’ rights, expression of dissent online—all rolled into one and grafted onto the framing of a 
“success story.”
During the 20 days after the airing of these episodes of Four Corners and Q+A, up to 14 March, 
China witnessed dramatic improvements in its efforts to contain the virus. But China’s success 
raised an uncomfortable question for journalist Stan Grant, who had been a panelist on the Four 
Corners program. In an online article for ABC News, musing about what he called a “dangerous 
idea,” Grant asks, “What if it turns out that an authoritarian regime is better-equipped to handle the 
coronavirus emergency than liberal democracies?” (Grant 2020) and “What if the Chinese 
Communist Party teaches us all a lesson?” This question also seems to underlie Bill Birtles’ report-
ing. As China’s situation improved and Australia’s situation deteriorated, Birtles (2020) asked 
whether Australia can “learn from Xi Jinping’s tactics.” On one hand, Birtles’ analysis is couched 
within the standard “China is to blame” framework: “Given the cover-ups, wrong information and 
underreported figures in the initial weeks—which helped turn a local outbreak in Wuhan into a 
global pandemic—skepticism of the Government’s infection rates is fair.” On the other hand, having 
witnessed firsthand the efforts at containing the virus, the journalist admits, “But on the ground, the 
broad and restrictive nature of the outbreak measures make it easier to understand how authorities 
have managed to curtail the viral spread—at least for now” (Birtles, 2020a). Birtles narrated the 
daily toll of isolation and the cost of restrictive measures on people’s lives, and also asked some 
Australia-based experts to comment on the suitability of applying similarly stringent measures in 
Australia. He quoted a University of New South Wales professor of epidemiology as saying “It’s 
hard for individuals to have the greater good in their minds, so I completely understand why China 
chose that approach.” Like Raina McIntyre, who appeared in Four Corners and Q+A, this epidemi-
ologist recognized that judgment of a country’s success or failure should be based on public health, 
not on ideology.
Commercial media: masks of Chinese influence
The COVID-19 outbreak started in China in late January, but had spread to many other countries 
by early March. Throughout the entire period of the pandemic, the Chinese diaspora, scattered 
across various places in the world, have been on high alert. They initially watched with growing 
concern about how the pandemic was affecting their families and friends in China. But as China 
gained control over the virus, many became anxious about how the governments of their current 
places of residence were dealing with the crisis, having heard about what China had to do to bring 
it under control. Starting in mid-March 2020, the following Chinese-language meme found its way 
onto WeChat: “The battle against COVID-19: China played the first half, the world played the 
second half, and overseas Chinese were on the field throughout.” The meme very quickly became 
popular among migrants from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), since it accurately and viv-
idly captured their anxiety about COVID-19. An analysis of how the Australian media covered 
COVID-19 is, therefore, not complete without considering the responses and actions of Chinese 
migrant communities, as well as how the mainstream English-language media framed these 
responses and actions.
Just as the Australian broadcast media’s dual structure features public and commercial sectors, 
the Australian press has also historically featured a dualism between Fairfax (often considered to be 
on the left), and News Corp (seen as on the right). But as far as reporting on China is concerned, 
Fairfax/Nine and News Corp have become, in the view of Gareth Evans (2020), “indistinguishable.” 
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SMH, otherwise considered left-leaning, in fact, has an explicit agenda of reporting on Chinese 
influence, as evidenced in the paper’s own advertisement: “If Beijing’s ambition affects Australia’s 
future. You deserve to know” (“China’s Growing Influence,” 2019). In exposing Beijing’s ambi-
tions, SMH (2019) promises to “shine a light on hidden influences,” using “hard news to expose soft 
power.” In order to achieve this, its slogan was “we do whatever it takes to break the stories,” but 
curiously, this now seems to have been removed from their promotional material.
SMH’s most controversial story about China and COVID-19 was written by Kate McClymont, 
who, unlike Peter Hartcher who was critical of China’s handling of the Covid 19 (Hartcher 2020a 
and 2020b), usually does not write on China. Winner of many journalistic awards and widely 
respected for her fearless investigative journalism into a wide range of issues—corruption, crime, 
and so on—McClymont suddenly found herself labeled as a China-basher.
Tipped off by a whistle-blower, McClymont (2020) wrote that
as the coronavirus took hold in Wuhan earlier this year, staff from the Chinese government-backed global 
property giant Greenland Group were instructed to put their normal work on hold and source bulk supplies 
of essential medical items to ship back to China.
Although the news story included nothing inflammatory and was essentially based on stating 
“the facts,” it enraged many PRC migrants, who saw this as a perfectly legal “humanitarian effort” 
consisting of donations from companies and individuals in Australia (Reubenstein, 2020a). What 
seems to be at issue here is not so much the story’s factual accuracy; rather, it is that a perfectly 
legal action by a Chinese company and several individuals was deemed newsworthy since it 
cohered with the pre-existing China influence narrative framework. The use of the term “whistle-
blower” carries the connotation that this was misconduct at best, illegal at worst, even though those 
involved broke no laws.
This report was offensive to Australia’s Chinese communities, first, because shipping medical 
supplies from Australia to China when—as the journalist herself acknowledges—the Australian 
government and health authorities were not anticipating a serious pandemic in Australia, was 
intended as a humanitarian gesture: “At this time [January-February] China was battling the 
COVID-19 epidemic. As of February 14 Australia had only 15 known cases” (McClymont, 2020). 
But by publishing the story on 26 March, when Australia had 2300 cases and was now acutely in 
need of masks and other medical supplies, the story acquired a far more sinister implication. 
Second, most readers could be forgiven for concluding from McClymont’s story that China was 
nothing short of predatory, and that the Chinese diaspora had misplaced loyalty. For the Chinese 
community, which prides itself on being able to love both their motherland and Australia and on 
being willing to help both whenever they can, to have their loyalty questioned in this way was 
deeply hurtful. Finally, what baffled Chinese-Australian readers was that, until this article appeared, 
McClymont, one of SMH’s most respected journalists, had refrained from joining the paper’s 
China influence agenda. In a joint response to the story, Dr Tony Pun, National President of the 
Chinese Community Council of Australia (CCCA), and Dr Ka Sing Chua, the CCCA’s National 
Senior Advisor, wrote that many Australian journalists’ perceptions of the nation’s Chinese com-
munities were “racist,” and that this kind of reporting can be “traumatic both mentally and physi-
cally” to these communities (Pun & Chua, 2020).
The politics of face masks has continued to play itself out as the pandemic has unfolded. As 
COVID-19 became a serious concern in Australia in early March, and as supplies of masks and 
other PPE became plentiful in China, the Chinese community in Australia wanted to do their bit, 
this time by importing masks and medical equipment from China. Ironically, although they acted 
out of a love for both homeland and adopted country in both cases, they soon realized that neither 
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or their “good deeds” was taken at face value by mainstream English-language media. A week after 
McClymont’s story, SMH’s key contributor to the Chinese influence narrative, Nick McKenzie, 
wrote a “sequel,” this time about some members of the Chinese community’s efforts to source 
medical supplies for Australia in China, accusing them of peddling the Chinese government’s 
agenda:
The work of Mr Kuang has multiple aims according to sources aware of his activities and open source 
documents sighted by The Age and Herald, which include both humanitarian and political considerations. 
. . . But Mr Kuang is also operating to further Beijing’s strategic aims and reputation, including building 
political influence in Australia. (McKenzie, 2020)
Nick McKenzie, also an award-winning journalist, was the chief investigator for the joint ABC-
Fairfax episode of Four Corners discussed earlier, a program which led to two defamation suits 
(Cornwall, 2018; Griffiths, 2018). Consistent with his usual practice of writing about Chinese 
influence, McKenzie (2020) cites vague sources he cannot identify, and says, “People familiar with 
his [Kuang’s] plans said he wanted to help Australia’s efforts to contain the virus and assist China’s 
soft power and political influence goals in this country through charitable activity.” While there is 
nothing surprising about McKenzie writing yet another story about Chinese influence, some 
Chinese Australians were outraged by the fact that a genuine humanitarian effort still could not 
escape being branded an act of Chinese influence. Whether they were sending medical supplies to 
China or bringing them to Australia, this community found itself embroiled in what they called 
“mask politics,” at a time when diplomatic relations between China and Australia seemed to be on 
a downward spiral, and they ended up being blamed either way. As Australia-based China Studies 
scholar David Brophy (2020) observes, in response to McClymont’s and McKenzie’s articles on 
masks politics, “Chinese Australians have been depicted as predators for exporting masks and 
Personal Protective Equipment to Wuhan at the height of its crisis, and as subversive influence-
peddlers when they imported the same items back from China to Australia.”
But it would be wrong to assume that SMH monopolizes claims of the Chinese diaspora profit-
ing from medical supplies during the pandemic. On 1 May, Seven, a free-to-air commercial 
Australian television network, published a story titled “Cash, Coronavirus and Baby Formula: The 
Truth about Wuhan’s Mercy Flight to Australia” (Burke, 2020).1 The report suggested that Richard 
Yuan, chair of the Australia China Entrepreneurs Club, attempted to sell a shipment of medical 
supplies to Australian government agencies in the early stages of the pandemic. On 24 June, Seven 
issued an apology to Mr Yuan on its official website, saying that
Mr Yuan has advised Seven that neither he nor his Association, namely Australia China Goodwill 
Association (ACGA), sought to profit (nor have they profited) from the shipment of supplies, but rather 
intended that they be donated to local communities. Seven accepts that this is the case and officially and 
openly apologises to Mr Yuan and his family. (quoted in Reubenstein, 2020b)
Fear and loathing in the tabloid media and on shock-jock radio
While the ABC framed COVID-19 in China in terms of disinformation, censorship and authoritar-
ian control, and the respectable end of the commercial papers such as SMH sang from much the 
same song sheet but with a distinct interest in pushing its China influence discourse, Australia’s 
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tabloid and shock-jock media dealt in racism-tinged sensationalism, pure and simple. This strategy, 
clearly aimed at attracting viewers and growing subscriptions, nevertheless adopted a few tropes. 
The first is that of conspiracy theory. This was illustrated when Paul Murray interviewed some 
right-wing commentators and Liberal backbenchers on Murdoch’s Sky News. One commentator 
approvingly cited the Falun Gong-backed paper Epoch Times, which had alleged that COVID-19 
was “concocted by the Chinese Communist Party,” and endorsed wild conspiracy theories about 
COVID-19 being a deliberate Chinese Communist Party plot (“Australia to ‘Reap the Rewards of 
Surrendering to China for the Past Decade’,” 2020). Bronwyn Bishop (quoted in Media Watch, 
2020), a former member of the Australian Parliament for 30 years, also confidently claimed on Sky 
that the virus was a Chinese biological weapon. This conspiracy theory was further promoted by 
Alan Jones on 16 March on his Sydney-based talk-back radio program, and a similar theory, sug-
gesting that China deliberately unleashed the virus to attack the West, was also given oxygen on 5 
March on 2GB by radio and Sky News host Chris Smith.
The second trope involves racist jokes and headlines at the expense of Chinese people. Tabloid 
papers got creative with clever or provocative anti-Chinese headlines: “China Kids Stay Home” 
(Armstrong & Hildebrandt, 2020, p. 1), for a story about children who had just returned to 
Australia from China; and “Chinese Virus Panda-monium,” with “panda” highlighted in a differ-
ent color (Argoon & McArthur, 2020: 1). Reports such as these incurred widespread wrath among 
members of the Chinese community. Two days after these headlines appeared, a petition started 
on change.org, calling for the Herald Sun and Daily Telegraph to apologize over their “downright 
offensive and unacceptable” headlines (Wong, 2020); to date (August 2020), it has gathered 
93,500 signatures.
The third trope takes the form of a war of words between Chinese government officials and 
tabloid writers over the Australian media’s coverage of China. On 1 April, Sydney’s Chinese 
Consulate-General (2020a) took issue with The Daily Telegraph for a series of articles that were 
“full of ignorance, prejudice and arrogance” about China’s response to COVID-19. The Telegraph 
hit back with more articles, including a point-by-point response to the statement (Blair, 2020b). 
The stories adopted a combative tone, aiming to insult rather than engage. In response to the 
Consulate-General’s statement that the Communist Party of China adopted a “people-centred phi-
losophy” in its handling of the pandemic virus, Blair (2020b) replied, “Please tell us more about 
your ‘people-centred philosophy’ and how many bullets it requires.” The Consulate-General 
(2020b) then criticized a story from 22 April featuring images that “insult China” and including a 
“defaced design of China’s national emblem maliciously linking COVID-19 with China,” and 
demanded a public apology from the Telegraph. But the paper doubled down on its attack, continu-
ing to publish strongly anti-China pieces (e.g. Blair, 2020a).
Conclusion
While a country’s success or failure in containing the virus is significantly determined by the politi-
cal will of its government and its style of governance, this analysis suggests that how the media of 
a given country report on China’s handling of COVID-19 is shaped by myriad factors, including 
that country’s relationship with China, its position in the global geopolitical order, the dominant 
ways in which its media narratives depicted China prior to the outbreak of COVID-19, and, of 
course, the degree of pluralism in that country’s mainstream journalism. Thus, how various seg-
ments of the Australian media have reported on China’s COVID-19 experience says more about 
their own fears and anxieties and their political, ideological, and cultural positions than about the 
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reality of how the Chinese people experienced COVID-19. This analysis makes it clear that, while 
Australia’s media may give the impression that there is only one story to tell about China and 
COVID-19 and there is only one way of telling that story, in reality the frames, perspectives, and 
discursive positions they adopt are cultural rather than natural, ideologically influenced and profit-
driven rather than objective, balanced, or fair. The virus may know no boundaries, but virus-related 
reporting is profoundly bound up with politics, history, and the cultural identity of a nation.
Despite the differences between various media sectors in Australia, this analysis allows us to 
make a few observations. First, in their reporting on China, there is a convergence not only between 
the public and commercial media sectors, but also between liberal and conservative media. Across 
the board, there is a high level of unfavorable reporting about China in relation to COVID-19, and 
favorable reporting has either been played down or left out. The WHO’s praise of China’s efforts, 
which was published in Chinese state media, was not widely reported in Australia; in fact, the only 
reporting argued that the WHO was not tough enough with China (e.g. Rauhala, 2020). Some 
Western journalists (e.g. Johnson, 2020) argued that China had acted quickly despite an initial 
delay, thereby buying the rest of the world time. These opinions were extensively circulated on 
some social media platforms, but did not gain traction in Australia’s mainstream media. Despite 
China’s success in controlling the pandemic, as evidenced in the rapidly decreasing numbers of 
infections and deaths, the Australian media made light of this achievement and continued to look 
to elsewhere—at times to South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan—for lessons. Reporting on China’s 
success in managing COVID-19 would have been ideologically unappealing.
Second, while the overall tone of reporting on China and COVID-19 is unfavorable, there is a 
division of labor between discursive sectors of the media. As discussed earlier, the ABC has con-
tinued its long-standing liberalist framework of criticizing China’s information censorship and 
government control, either by conflating political authoritarianism with the authoritarian measures 
necessary to contain the virus, or by fusing the political control narrative with China’s efforts to 
control COVID-19. While a narrative focus on China’s censorship, propaganda, and draconian 
public health measures are compatible with the ABC’s existing framework for reporting on China, 
the respectable end of the commercial press, such as SMH, also continued its China influence nar-
rative in its framing of the Chinese Australians’ two-way humanitarian efforts, thereby applying its 
erstwhile advertising promise of doing “whatever it takes” to its pursuit of this narrative.
Meanwhile, the tabloid press and shock-jock radio have continued to serve up a potent cocktail of 
fear about the “yellow peril,” anxiety about “reds under the bed,” and an orientalist perception of the 
Chinese as an alien and repugnant people who eat bats. As one Australia-based commentator observed,
Many people attributed the devastating situation in Wuhan to the existence of communism in China, as if 
the virus were partial to a set of political ideals, asserting that the Chinese people have “backwards” 
hygiene practices and a “poor” healthcare system. (Qian, 2020)
This analysis focuses on narrative frames, and only studies the impact on audiences in indirect 
ways—such as readers’ responses in petitions, protests, and forum comments. In late-June 2020, 
6 months after the first outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan, Australia’s think-tank the Lowy Institute 
published its annual poll of public sentiment on global issues. The poll shows that only 23% of 
adult Australians now trust China “a great deal” or “somewhat” to act responsibly in the world, 
compared with 52% in 2018 (Kassam, 2020, p. 6). Although there is no direct proof linking the 
media’s coverage of China to Australia’s public sentiment—during the pandemic or otherwise—it 
is fairly safe to speculate that such a connection does exist. After all, Australians mostly find out 
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what China did and did not do from their favorite media outlets and their preferred social media 
opinion leaders.
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Note
1. Burke’s story (https://7news.com.au/lifestyle/health-wellbeing/cash-coronavirus-and-baby-formula-
the-truth-about-wuhans-mercy-flight-to-australia) and Seven’s apology to Mr Yuan (https://7news.
com.au/features/apology-to-mr-richard-yuan–c-11222670) has now been deleted from Seven’s web-
site. The Knowledgia source provides an excerpt from the report, and Reubenstein (2020b) quotes 
from the apology.
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